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When microbes compete for limited resources, they often engage in chemical warfare using bac-
terial toxins. This competition can be understood in terms of evolutionary game theory (EGT).
We study the predictions of EGT for the bacterial “suicide bomber” game in terms of the phase
portraits of population dynamics, for parameter combinations that cover all interesting games for
two-players, and seven of the 38 possible phase portraits of the three-player game. We compare these
predictions to simulations of these competitions in finite well-mixed populations, but also allowing
for probabilistic rather than pure strategies, as well as Darwinian adaptation over tens of thousands
of generations. We find that Darwinian evolution of probabilistic strategies stabilizes games of the
rock-paper-scissors type that emerge for parameters describing realistic bacterial populations, and
point to ways in which the population fixed point can be selected by changing those parameters.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg,87.10.Mn,87.18.Hf
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) [1–3] has become
one of the pillars of evolutionary biology because it is
a mathematically accessible framework that can account
for the strategic aspect of frequency-dependent fitness,
that is, if the fitness of a genotype depends on the fre-
quency of other genotypes in the population. EGT is
particularly useful when dealing with populations that
include a mix of different strategies, and takes into ac-
count the concept of “inclusive fitness” that encompasses
how an organism contributes to the fitness of other ge-
netically similar or even different types [4–6]. Conse-
quently, EGT has been used to study the conditions for
the emergence, maintenance, and evolution of coopera-
tion as well as altruism [7–9]. Of particular importance
is the application of EGT to microbial communities (see,
e.g., [10]). The competitive interaction between microbes
(and even viruses [11, 12]) is often best described within
the language of games [13–15], and they display coopera-
tive and other types of social behavior [16], cheating [17],
and even an extreme form of altruism where some com-
munity members sacrifice themselves for the sake of oth-
ers. Another hallmark of microbial community dynamics
is the observation of cyclically competing species with
non-transitive relationships [18]. Of particular interest is
EGT’s prediction of evolutionary fixed points for some
dynamical interactions but not others, and characteri-
zation of the stability of orbits within the phase space
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of strategies. However, how these predictions compare
to realistic dynamics of adapting populations of cells, in
particular those making stochastic decisions [19], is not
always clear. Here, we study the predictions of EGT
as applied to a simple bacterial system where different
strategies of survival potentially coexist in the same pop-
ulation, or where strategic decisions are made stochasti-
cally rather than deterministically.
Among the weapons that bacteria use to battle each
other is the production of colicin, a bacterial toxin that
is lethal to most strains of E. coli bacteria. Those strains
that can produce the toxin are usually unharmed by it
due to a resistance gene encoded on a plasmid within the
cell. The individual that actually deploys the toxin, how-
ever, pays the ultimate price as that cell literally explodes
to distribute the toxin to as large a fraction of the popu-
lation as possible. This ultimate act of altruism is benefi-
cial to the “suicide bomber”’s kin because it frees up the
resource that both sensitive and resistant types are using,
for the sole benefit of the resistant types. This system
has been studied experimentally [18, 20], and its dynam-
ics studied in terms of payoff matrices [21]. Some of the
dynamics we observe falls into the “Rock-Paper-Scissors”
(RPS) category of games, which have been studied an-
alytically and experimentally [1, 2, 10, 18, 22–25] (see
also the review [26]). We study the EGT predictions of
the equilibrium frequency of strategies in the population
(when this equilibrium exists), how this equilibrium is
modified when additional strategies can be produced via
mutations, and how EGT predictions fare when popula-
tion sizes are finite. To study these predictions we use
different numerical simulation methods, and in particular
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2study strategies that evolve via mutation and selection in
a purely Darwinian manner [27]. Furthermore, because
the expression of the toxin is probabilistic in nature (ex-
perimentally, only between 1% and 5% of the bacteria
that carry the toxin plasmid actually express it [20, 21]),
we study fully stochastic strategies with evolvable prob-
abilities. In the following, we first introduce the notation
and a discussion of equilibrium points in the well-known
two-player game, setting the stage for a similar analysis
of the three-player game.
II. TWO-PLAYER SUICIDE BOMBER GAME
Evolutionary game theory makes accurate predictions
about the outcome of two-player games, whether the
strategies are deterministic (‘pure’ strategies) or prob-
abilistic (‘mixed’ strategies, where a player uses different
pure strategies with different probabilities). The cen-
tral concept of EGT is the “evolutionary stable strategy”
(ESS): If only one strategy is determined to be an ESS,
we should find this and only this strategy to be the win-
ner in a competition. In a game with two strategies I
and J , I is an ESS if the payoff E(I, I) when playing
itself is larger than the payoff E(J, I) between any other
strategy J and I, i.e., [1]
I is ESS if E(I, I) > E(J, I) . (1)
In case E(I, I) = E(J, I), then I is an ESS if the strategy
plays better against any other strategy J then that other
strategy fares against itself:
E(I, J) > E(J, J) when E(I, I) = E(J, I). (2)
In principle, a mixture of strategies can be an ESS. So
introduce the population mixture described by the vec-
tor p = (pI , pJ) where pI is the population fraction of
strategy I and pI + pJ = 1. Then pˆ is an ESS if (and
only if) for all q (see e.g., [2])
pˆ · Epˆ ≥ q · Epˆ , (3)
and at the same time
if q 6= pˆ and pˆ · Epˆ = q · Epˆ, then pˆ · Eq > q · Eq . (4)
Here, E is the payoff matrix introduced above. Eqs. (3,4)
are just the population generalizations of (1,2). Condi-
tion (3) defines the Nash equilibrium point of the pop-
ulation, while (4) is the stability condition for the Nash
equilibrium. It turns out, however, that the concept of
an ESS is not as general as one might wish, because while
every ESS is a stable attractor of the population dynam-
ics (in the language of dynamical systems theory), not
every stable attractor is an ESS [28–30]. Thus, instead
of focusing on ESSs, in the following we study the fixed
points and phase portraits of the dynamics that the pay-
off matrix induces.
In the two-player “suicide bomber” game of colicin
warfare, the payoff between the wild-type (which we de-
note here as strain ‘00’) and the colicin-producing (but
resistant) type ‘RT’ is such that E(00, 00) = 1, but
E(00,RT) = 0, that is, a wildtype strain is killed by
a strain expressing the toxin. On the other hand, RT
is itself inferior to the wildtype because it carries the
cost of that resistance, so E(RT,RT) < 1. Finally,
E(RT, 00) > 1, expressing the advantage the colicin pro-
ducer has due to the suicidal behavior of its kin [21]. Note
that the cost of resistance is typically of the order of 15%
of wild-type fitness, but can be as small as 1% [31] or as
large as 60% [32]. The cost of producing the colicin (in-
cluding the reduction of growth rate by cell lysing) may
be even higher, depending on the frequency with which
colicin is being produced [32]. Our notation ‘00’ and
‘RT’ for the two different types comes from the observa-
tion that the production and the resistance of colicin in
bacteria are usually encoded by two different genes (‘R’
for resistance, and ‘T’ for toxin), but most often within
the same plasmid.
We study a model in which two parameters govern the
interaction between types: the benefit ε ≥ 0 of expressing
the toxin and the cost ω ≥ 0, and vary these parameters
systematically. In principle, the two genes R and T could
each carry a different cost, but for most of the calcula-
tions in this study we will keep them the same. The ESS
is determined by the following payoff matrix E:
( 00 RT
00 1 0
RT 1− 2ω + ε 1− 2ω
)
. (5)
The advantage ε is a variable that depends on the spatial
structure of the environment and the distribution of types
in it, because suicide behavior will be more effective when
the resource that is freed up is more likely to be used by
the resistant kind. Thus, we study what strategy is an
ESS as a function of the parameters ω and ε. In terms of
the more conventional notation of two-player games we
have R = 1, S = 0, T = 1−2ω+ ε, and P = 1−2ω, that
is, 00 is the cooperating type. Because payoff matrices
that only differ when adding a constant to each column
induce the same dynamics, we can bring the matrix into
normal form so that the diagonal vanishes:
E =
(
0 2ω − 1
ε− 2ω 0
)
. (6)
The fixed points, stability, and phase portrait of such
games has been solved (see, e.g, [26, 30]). The dynamics
falls into four regions that harbor three different phase
portraits. In Region I, defined by ω < 1/2, ω < ε/2 we
find the standard prisoner’s dilemma, where the “defect-
ing” strategy is ESS as well as an attractor. We indi-
cate in Fig. 1 the parameter region for this dynamics,
along with a pictogram that describes the phase portrait
with the convention that solid circles represent attrac-
tors and open circles denote repellers. Thus, in this lan-
guage the wild-type is the cooperator and the suicide
bomber the defector. For ω > 1/2, ω > ε/2 (region
3II) there is no dilemma and the wild-type is the ESS.
When ω > 1/2, ω < ε/2 (region III), the game is an
“anti-coordination game” sometimes called “snowdrift”
or “Hawk-Dove”, giving rise to a stable population mix-
ture of strategies as indicated by the fixed point along
the trajectory connecting the wild-type and the suicidal
type RT, with p00 =
2ω−1
ε−1 . If on the other hand ω <
1
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FIG. 1. Fixed points and flow for different two-player games
as a function of game parameters, for ω ∈ (0, 1) and ε ∈ (0, 2).
Region I: Prisoner’s Dilemma, region II: “Harmony” game,
region III: Snowdrift game, region IV: “coordination” game
(see, e.g., [10]).
and ω > ε/2 (region IV), both strategies are an ESS
as well as attractors, and the ultimate winner depends
on which strategy is more abundant at the start of the
competition, as was observed in the Chao-Levin exper-
iment [20] in a well-mixed environment. Note that this
regime corresponds to a “coordination” game. If strate-
gies are probabilistic, equations (3) and (4) predict dom-
inance of a mixed strategy with the probability to engage
in ‘00’ play given by the p00 shown above [1]. The differ-
ent predicted phases are consistent with those observed
for competitions between sensitive and resistant types on
a lattice [33]. We can confirm the predictions of EGT by
numerical simulation of the population dynamics using
replicator equations [1, 2]:
p˙00(t) = p00(t)(w00 − w¯) , (7)
w¯ = p00(t)w00 + (1− p00(t))wRT , (8)
with
w00 = p00E(00, 00) + (1− p00)E(00,RT) , (9)
wRT = p00E(RT, 00) + (1− p00)E(RT,RT) . (10)
We show the result of this simulation in Fig. 2a, where
both strategies were initialized with p = 0.5. The replica-
tor equation simulations recapitulate the phase portraits
in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 2. ESS as a function of the parameters ε and ω. (a):
Numerical simulation of the population frequencies based on
replicator equations, with both types at equal frequency ini-
tially. (b) Simulation of a finite well-mixed population of
agents that encode the strategies 00 and RT deterministically,
with the same initial conditions as in (a) [50 independent sim-
ulations for each of 21×21 different parameter combinations].
In (a) and (b), red and green intensity indicates the frequency
of strategy 00 and RT in the population, respectively. The
separation between red and green in region IV is due to the
choice of initial condition, and does not represent a phase
boundary.
We can also compare the EGT prediction to a simula-
tion of the evolution of agents that receive payoffs (5) in
a finite (but large) well-mixed population of 16,384 inter-
acting agents. Here, each player’s strategy is determined
by a ‘genome’ with a single locus p00 that stands for the
probability to engage in action 00. For each agent, we
randomly pick four opponents, and the aggregate score
against them is used as a fitness. We replace 2% of the
population at each update, using a death-birth Moran
process [34] (for more details on the simulations, see Sec-
tion III C). If we start the population with 50% genotypes
reflecting the wildtype (p00 = 1) and 50% expressing the
RT phenotype (p00 = 0) without any mutations so that
the pure strategies compete, we recapitulate the theoret-
ical results as well as the replicator equation simulations
(see Fig. 2b). If strategies can be mixed and we allow
mutations on p00, we find p00 → 2ω−1−1 as expected (data
not shown). Indeed, it can be shown that for two-player
games, the predicted population fraction fixed points are
equal to the fixed points in the space of decision probabil-
ities, and that the stability of these fixed points also co-
incides [1]. For the three-player game, the fixed points of
deterministic and stochastic strategic also coincide, but
the stability conditions do not.
III. THREE-PLAYER GAME
So far we studied the adaptive change of genotype fre-
quencies and expression probabilities, but we have not
addressed the consequences of macroscopic mutations.
While the toxin gene and the resistance gene are usually
tightly linked on the same plasmid [35], cells can acquire
4resistance to the toxin without carrying the plasmid, for
example by changes to a receptor or the membrane pro-
tein that imports the colicin. However, such changes are
usually costly because the same proteins are also involved
in importing nutrients into the cell.
To take mutations that create new strategies into ac-
count, we introduce the additional type ‘R0’ (the type
‘0T’, which we simulate using Darwinian evolution below,
does not play a role here because it is never an ESS), and
study how the possibility of mutating into this type af-
fects the stability of the fixed points. In a general payoff
matrix for the suicide-bomber game, non-resistant cells
suffer an effect ∆ ≥ 0 from exposure to the colicin, and
carrying the toxin gene incurs a cost ω while resistance
decreases fitness by δ ≥ 0. As before, the advantage of
the RT phenotype is ε. The payoff E is now:

00 R0 RT
00 1 1 1−∆
R0 1− δ 1− δ 1− δ
RT 1− δ − ω + ε 1− δ − ω 1− δ − ω
 . (11)
With these values, the resistant type R0 is superior to
the resistant toxin producer RT but inferior to the wild-
type 00 because of the cost of resistance. The dynamics
of these three strains can become non-transitive so that
all three strain can outcompete each other in a classic
rock-paper-scissors (RPS) dynamic [18]. We can study
the fixed points and phase portraits of this game the-
oretically, as well as via agent-based simulations. For
simplicity, we take ∆ = 1 as before, and restrict our-
selves to δ = ω (cost of resistance equal to cost of toxin).
Furthermore, we can normalize the payoffs such that the
diagonal vanishes, so that the payoff matrix becomes
E =
 0 ω 2ω − 1−ω 0 ω
ε− 2ω −ω 0
 . (12)
A. Stability and Zeeman classes
The population dynamics of three-player games has
been solved completely [30], and crucially depends on
the structure of fixed points in the interior or on the
boundary of the 2-simplex ∆ defined by the probabilities
(p00, pR0, pRT) with the constraint p00 + pR0 + pRT = 1.
Using this 2-simplex, a simplified phase portrait of the
dynamics can be constructed using a notation depicting
attractors and repellers just as in Fig. 1. Zeeman showed
that the dynamics fall into ten combinatorial classes (up
to sign-reversal of each element of the payoff matrix),
depending on the number of fixed points in the interior
and on the boundary of the simplex. Each combinatorial
class itself may contain one or more stable classes giv-
ing rise to 19 different “stable” phase portraits plus their
“inverses”, where all flow directions are reversed and at-
tractors are replaced by repellers and vice versa. Here,
“stable” means that the phase portrait does not change
drastically within a neighborhood of the parameter val-
ues defining the game. [30]. The three-player suicide-
bomber game as defined by (12) displays seven of these
classes in seven regions, as shown in Fig. 3 and listed
in Table I. An interior fixed point only exists for the
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FIG. 3. Phase portraits of stable dynamics for the three-
player game using payoffs (12). The shaded parameter region
ω < ε/(ε + 1) has an interior fixed point that can be repulsive
or attractive. In Zeeman’s phase portrait pictograms [30],
arrows denote the flow on the boundary of the simplex, solid
circles are attractors and open circles are repellers. All fixed
points on the boundary and the interior are indicated. The
Zeeman classes for each region are indicated in Table I.
parameter region ω ≤ εε+1 , shown shaded in Fig. 3, so
that regions III and IV of the two-player game now con-
tain dynamics with a fixed point, and dynamics without.
In region II, the wild-type 00 is a stable attractor just
as in the two-player game. The only difference is that
there are now many different paths from strategy RT to
00 that include R0 as an intermediate type. Region I
(corresponding to the Prisoner’s Dilemma region in the
two-player game) has an interior fixed point (the Nash
equilibrium) for payoff matrix (12)[36]
p00 =
ω
ε
, (13)
pR0 = 1− ω
ε
− ω , (14)
pRT = ω . (15)
that is attractive when detE > 0 (region Ia) and repul-
sive for detE < 0 [30] (region Ib). For our payoff matrix,
the boundary is given by the line ε = 1, as indicated in
Fig. 3. The dynamic in this region is a rock-paper-scissors
(RPS) game that is stable if ε > 1, that is, the popula-
tion fractions approach the interior fixed point given by
Eqs. (13-15). For ε < 1 the RPS game is unstable, and we
expect to observe heteroclinic orbits that ultimately pass
through the single-strategy fixed points. These oscilla-
tions are similar to those observed by May and Leonard
in the Lotka-Volterra dynamics of three species [37].
5Region Zeeman class
Ia 1
Ib -1
II 2
IIIa 52
IIIb 51
IVa −52
IVb −51
TABLE I. Zeeman classes [30] for the seven regions with stable
dynamics. Note that regions IIIa and IVa, as well as IIIb and
IVb are sign-opposites, that is, the matrix of signs of entries in
the normalized payoff matrix (up to permutations) is reversed.
The “snowdrift” region of the two-player game is now
divided into region IIIa with a stable fixed point that is a
mixture of RT and 00 only as in the two-player game, and
a region IIIb with a stable interior fixed point given by
Eqs. (13-15). The anti-coordination region of the two-
player game (regions IVa and IVb off the three-player
game) show just the inverse of the dynamics in regions
IIIa and IIIb, as outlined in Figure 3. Thus, in region
IVb the R0-type is short-lived and the game reverts to
a two-player game with its attendant stability properties
(just as in region IIIa).
A simulation of strategy competition using the replica-
tor equations validates the phase portraits of the various
Zeeman classes, as seen in Fig. 4a. For these simula-
tions, we used starting conditions where all three strate-
gies are equiprobable, and stopped after a finite num-
ber of updates of the equations. As a consequence, a
particular strategy appears to be dominant for the un-
stable RPS game (blue in Fig. 4a, left) even though in
fact the trajectory cycles through the three pure strate-
gies. The expanding orbits of parameter combination A
in region Ia become shrinking orbits for region Ib (see
parameter combination B), but because the orbits still
touch the boundary, there is a chance of strategy extinc-
tion in finite populations. Parameter combination C in
Fig. 4a is also in region Ib, but because the orbits are
tighter, extinction is unlikely even in finite populations.
If ε = 1 in region I, the orbits are limit cycles encircling
the fixed points, but this dynamic is not “stable” in the
sense of Zeeman as infinitesimal changes in the payoffs
will change the trajectories qualitatively. Indeed, Zee-
man proved that there are no structurally stable limit
cycles in three-player games [30]. As ε passes through
the critical value ε = 1, the flow exhibits a Hopf bifurca-
tion [38].
Parameter combination D in Fig. 4a lies in region IIIb
which has an interior fixed point. This point lies close
to the boundary of region IIIA in which the fixed point
is on the edge (complete extinction of strategy R0). In-
deed, the equilibrium concentration of strategy R0 for
combination D is pR0 ≈ 0.018.
B. Finite populations
If finite populations of pure strategy mixtures are sim-
ulated using agent-based methods as described earlier for
the two-player game (population size 16,384), the dynam-
ics are unchanged from the infinite population-size limit
for the parameter region II. However, the heteroclinic or-
bits that we observed in region Ib collapse when popula-
tions are finite (as was noticed previously in Ref. [25] for
a generic RPS game in region Ib), because both 00 and
RT go to extinction at the R0 fixed point (see Fig. 4b) if
the initial population consists of each strategy in equal
concentration. Because of the nature of the flow, R0 is
the surviving strategy for almost all initial conditions, re-
flecting a principle of “survival-of-the-weakest” discussed
recently in the context of cyclic stochastic games [39]. In-
terestingly, as we approach the boundary of region IVb,
fortunes are reversed: now R0 is dispensable and the
game reverts to the two-player coordination game, where
either RT or R0 survive, depending on the initial condi-
tion.
Similar dynamics were also observed in experimental
populations of sensitive, resistant, and toxin-producing
bacteria engaged in an RPS game [18] as long as disper-
sal was high, which corresponds to the well-mixed case
that we study here. However, loss of diversity (strategy
extinction) can also occur in region Ia where the fixed
point is stable, as long as the orbits have a high proba-
bility of touching the boundary before spiraling in. This
dynamic is seen for point B in Fig. 4b. For region III the
finite population size does not alter the phase portrait
appreciably: the fixed point in the interior is stable, and
even when one of the equilibrium concentrations is small
(as is the case for parameter combination D), the minor-
ity strategy does not disappear for the population size
we studied. Of course, for sufficiently small populations,
R0 has a chance of extinction even in region IIIb.
C. Stochastic strategies
As mentioned, cellular strategies in biology are often
stochastic rather than pure. The decision to contribute
to the stalk or the spore in the evolutionary game that
Dictyostelium plays when resources become scarce is fully
stochastic for example (p ≈ 0.5 in the wild type [17]).
This type of stochasticity is different from simulating
errors of execution and perception [40], that focus on
small deviations from the deterministic scenario, and
have been used extensively in the economical literature
(see, e.g., [41]). Stochastic strategies are often called
“mixed” strategies in the literature, but we prefer not
to use this nomenclature because “mixed” often evokes
the idea of a mix of pure strategies (a polymorphic popu-
lation). The fixed points of populations that use stochas-
tic strategic have been studied less extensively than the
phase portraits of deterministic populations, but some
important results are known [42–46]. For example, de-
6FIG. 4. (a) Left: Dominating strategy as determined by replicator equations as a function of cost ω and benefit ε, where
the density of each pure strategy is indicated by the intensity of the three colors red (00), green (RT), and blue (R0), given
the starting condition where each strategy has 1/3 of the population. Regions as in Fig. 3. Right: population fraction
trajectories obtained from iterating the replicator equations for four parameter combinations (ε, ω): A = (0.75, 0.125), B =
(1.25, 0.125), C = (1.75, 0.375) and D = (1.75, 0.625), whose locations are shown on the left. Arrows indicate the location of the
fixed points. (b) Dominating strategies in a finite population-size agent-based simulation of competition between pure strategies
in a mell-mixed population (left, 20 runs of 5,000 updates per pair of parameters, for 21×21 parameter combinations.). Right:
the trajectories for the four parameter combinations picked in (a) show stable coexistence for points C and D, but extinction of
strategies for A and B. (c) Left: Darwinian evolution of probabilistic strategies in an agent-based simulation at fixed mutation
rate (left, 20 replicates per pair of parameters, 21×21 parameter combinations), where colors indicate average fixed point
probabilities in the scheme of (a). The trajectories (right) represent the average probabilities to engage in the plays 00, R0,
and RT on an (averaged) line of descent, not trajectories of population frequencies. Arrows indicate the predicted fixed point.
Average of 50 replicate trajectories for 100,000 updates for each of the example parameters.
fine a stochastic strategy S(q) = (q00, qR0, qRT) where the
qi are the probabilities for this individual to engage in the
plays i, and let its frequency in the population be f(q).
Then the population mean strategy is
S¯ =
∑
q
f(q)S(q) , (16)
where we have assumed a discretization of strategy space
(these averages can be generalized to continuous strategy
spaces, see, e.g. [42, 43]).
If p is an ESS of the deterministic game defined by
payoff matrix E, then the population mean (stochastic)
strategy S¯ is a locally stable equilibrium of the mean
strategy evolution, defined by
f˙(q)(t)
f(q)
=
(
S(q)− S¯) · ES¯ (17)
if and only if
S¯ = p . (18)
In other words, the fixed points of the deterministic game
are the fixed points (in the sense that the population is
7“fixed” at S¯) of the stochastic game [43]. As a conse-
quence, if p is an ESS, then so is S¯. However, nothing
is known (to our knowledge) about the stability of fixed
points of the stochastic game that are not attractors for
the deterministic game. At the same time, even when the
population is fixed at S¯, the population composition can
change neutrally as long as the average S¯ is preserved.
To simulate the Darwinian evolution of probabilistic
strategies we introduce separate loci for the ‘R’ and ‘T’
gene, encoding the probabilities qR and qT . Thus, a
‘00’ phenotype is expressed with probability q00 = (1 −
qR)(1−qT ), while the R0 phenotype has qR0 = qR(1−qT )
and so forth. While we therefore also simulate the possi-
bility of a ‘0T’ phenotype, it never plays a dominant role
in the dynamics as expected. Like in our simulation of the
evolution of the two-player game, strategies play four ran-
dom other players in the population to determine the fit-
ness of the genotype (q, qT ), which determines the proba-
bility with which this strategy leaves offspring in the next
generation. The probabilities qR, qT can be viewed as the
stochastic decisions encoded by two different (and inde-
pendent) genetic pathways with many genes, but rather
than simulating how the genetic networks encode these
probabilities, we evolve them directly.
As before, we evolve the strategies using a death-birth
Moran process, by removing at every update a random
2% of a population of 1,024 genotypes in a well-mixed
population, and replacing them with a set of genotypes
that were picked (probabilistically, according to fitness)
from the set of players that survived the 2% removal (we
use a death-birth process rather than the more common
birth-death process to avoid the awkward case that a
genotype is born from a deleted type). When a genotype
is not replaced, fitness accumulates from playing more
games, but this does not result in a skewed age distribu-
tion as removal is random.
To determine the mean “fixed point” strategy for each
of 21× 21 parameter configurations (Fig. 4c, leftmost
panel), we first reconstruct the line of descent (LOD) of
each of 20 replicate populations evolved for 500,000 up-
dates, by picking the dominating strategy genotype and
follow its ancestral line all the way back to the seed geno-
type (a strategy with qR = qT = 0.5). The line of descent
recapitulates the evolutionary history of that particular
experiment, as it contains the sequence of mutations that
gave rise to the successful strategy at the end of the run
(see, e.g., [47]). The LOD also defines a trajectory in
strategy space, but rather than being a smooth curve the
LOD is jagged and jumps between probabilities. When
averaging the LODs across runs to obtain the fixed point,
we first discard the last 50,000 updates for each (in or-
der to make sure that our LOD has coalesced) and then
average the genotypes of the LOD after the first 250,000
updates, in order to ensure that the trajectory settled on
the fixed point (the procedure is described in more detail
in [27]).
To obtain the strategy trajectory S¯ for the four param-
eter combinations A-D used earlier, we collect the plays
of each agent in the population at each update (instead of
collecting the frequencies f(q) of each strategy S(q)), as
the plays faithfully recapitulate the genotype in a well-
mixed population [27]. The mean population strategy
is plotted for the first 100,000 updates of an average of
50 replicate experiments in Fig. 4c (right four panels).
As in previous work studying the evolution of stochas-
tic strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [27], the
population strategy moves to an evolutionary fixed point.
In the present case (a non-iterated game), the fixed point
is at (or close) to the Nash equilibrium of the determinis-
tic game. While the fixed points B-D are attractors (but
not ESSs), fixed point A is repulsive. For the stochas-
tic game, however, this fixed point turns out to be an
attractor.
In hindsight, this is not surprising when the competi-
tion is viewed in terms of an adaptive dynamics formal-
ism (see, e.g., [48, 49]) as the population does not engage
in a competition between three strategies that exclude
each other. Rather, the population is fairly monomor-
phic, centered around the single stochastic strategy with
probabilities given by the Nash fixed point. Thus, rather
than witnessing positive frequency-dependent selection
in a competition of three types, we see stable mutation-
selection balance of a single type.
We note that the diversity of plays that we observe
appears to contradict in part previous conclusions that
local dispersal promotes diversity in microbial dynam-
ics of the RPS-type [18]. These authors concluded that
spatial interaction environments (nearest-neighbor as op-
posed to well-mixed) promote diversity, observing coexis-
tence when a well-mixed population simulation predicted
extinction of two out of the three strategies, for parame-
ter combinations that we estimate puts their population
in the region IB or IVb, with a repelling fixed point. Yet,
when phenotypes are expressed probabilistically, strate-
gies are stabilized. However, while we know that at least
the decision to express the ‘T’ type is stochastic in mi-
crobial colicin phenotypes, the expression of the ‘R’ type
may be deterministic. Thus, our simulations cannot be
directly compared to the experiments of Ref. [18]. We
should also keep in mind that we have not explicitly taken
into account the effect of spatial structure [33] here, but
instead simply varied the payoff ε. However, the loss of
diversity was predicted to occur in the well-mixed mode,
which we show to be stable instead when decision are
probabilistic.
CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the fixed points and phase portraits
of populations engaged in game-theoretical dynamics in-
spired by the microbial “suicide-bomber” game. Depend-
ing on the physical parameter values that determine the
payoffs of different decisions, all the well-known games of
the two-player scenario are covered. When extending to
a three-player game by decoupling resistance from toxin
8production, we study the fixed points and stability not of
all possible three-player games, but a subset of seven of
38 possible phase portraits. When strategies are allowed
to be stochastic rather than deterministic, we observe
that the population mean strategy moves toward the de-
terministic strategy fixed point, but repelling fixed points
become attractive when decisions are probabilistic. We
stress again that the original ESS concept is lacking for
the three-player game, as none of the fixed points (even
the attractive ones) are ESSs in the sense of Maynard
Smith [1].
It is difficult to ascertain which dynamics we should
expect in natural populations, as the cost of production
of the colicin as well as the cost of resistance vary con-
siderably [31, 32]. In general, we should expect that the
costs are different, and that the efficiency of killing due
to bacteriocins is not 100%, so that the more general
model (11) should be used. But given these caveats,
our predictions of evolutionary fixed points as a func-
tion of cost and benefit parameters should be testable by
dedicated experiments of the sort described in [18], by
changing the parameters of the evolutionary game (for
example by experimentally varying the cost of resistance
or benefit of the toxin). Recently, Nahum et al. [32] have
studied the evolution by natural selection of the param-
eters that define the game, and found that the resistant
type (here, type R0) tended to evolve towards more re-
strained interactions (higher δ) compared to populations
that evolved in the absence of interactions, at least in the
case that migration was restricted so that spatial effects
are present. This appears to be a direct verification of the
“survival-of-the-weakest” principle [39, 50] that is appli-
cable in environments where finite population size intro-
duces stochasticity, in parameter region Ib of the three-
player game. Clearly it will be interesting to see more
general evolutionary trajectories within the ω, ε-space (or
the more general δ, ω, ε-space), under different realistic
constraints for spatial interactions, as well as costs of re-
sistance and toxin production that are constrained to lie
within biologically reasonable assumptions. It has pre-
viously been shown that changing environmental condi-
tions can change the dynamics fro a prisoner’s Dilemma
to a snowdrift game (moving from region I into region
III in Fig. 1) in the two-player game [14, 51]. It would
be interesting to test whether populations can be coaxed
to move from one Zeeman class to another in the three-
player game, simply be changing the selective pressures
acting on the system.
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